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COMMON LAW COPYRIGHT IN SPONTANEOUS ORAL
CONVERSATION
INTRODUCTION: COMMON LAW COPYRIGHTS
Common law copyright, as a literary property distinct from statutory
copyright, dates from the sixteenth century,' and is an incorporeal right.'
Thus, the ownership of literary property may be vested in one person
while its incorporeal embodiment may be held by another. Perhaps the
best illustration of these dual property rights is the distinction between
the rights of a writer and those of the recipient of a letter. While the
physical ownership of the paper on which the message is written is in the
recipient, the absolute right to publish the contents ordinarily remains in
the writer.'
Generally the common law copyright accrues to the originator or au-
thor of an intellectual creation.4 Literary property rights, however, may
be transferred by any method by which personal property is trans-
ferable, including sale.5 On the death of its creator, the common law
copyright descends to his personal representative or next of km in the
same manner as personal property 6
The fundamental property right granted the creator by the common
law is the exclusive use and control of his literary creation before publi-
cation. 7 This absolute monopoly precludes others from publishing or
Entered m the Nathan Barkan ASCAP COPYIGHT LAw CompmnoN, August, 1969.
1. E. S. DRowE, A TRTAISE ON Tm LAW OF PROPERTY 54 (1879); see also H. G. BAI.,
Tm LAw oF LrrERARY PRoPERTy § 4 (1944). Although common law copyright exists
independent of statute, its development has received specific statutory recognition in
17 U.S.C. § 2 (1964), which reads:
Nothing in this title shall be construed to annul or limit the right of
the author or proprietor of an unpublished work, at common law or in
equity, to prevent the copying, publication, or use of such unpublished
work without his consent, and to obtain damages therefor.
2. Werckmeister v. American Lithographic Co., 134 F 321, 323-24 (2d Cir. 1904);
Pushman v. New York Graphic Soc'y, Inc., 287 N.Y. 302, 307, 39 N.E.2d 249, 250
(1942); H. BArz, supra note 1, at § 8.
3. Grigsby v. Breckmridge, 65 Ky (2 Bush) 480, 92 Am. Dec. 509 (1867); Baker v.
Libbie, 210 Mass. 599, 97 N.E. 109 (1912); see generally H. BAIL, supra note 1, at
§ 225.
4. Werckmeister v. American Lithographic Co., 134 F 321, 324 (2d Cir. 1904);
Tomkins v. Halleck, 133 Mass. 32 (1882).
5. Atlantic Monthly Co. v. Post Publishing Co., 27 F.2d 556, 558 (D.C. Mass. 1928);
Pushman v. New York Graphic Soc'y, Inc., 287 N.Y. 302, 39 NE.2d 249 (1942).
6. Baker v. Libbie, 210 Mass. 599, 97 N.E. 109, 112 (1912); Palmer v. DeWitt, 47
N.Y. 532 (1872).
7. Frohman v. Ferris, 238 Ill. 430, 87 N.E. 327, 328 (1909), aff'd 223 U.S. 424 (1912);
Palmer v. DeWitt, 47 N.Y. 532 (1872); see generally H. BALr., supra note 1, at § 15.
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reproducing the work by any method," and may be enforced by mjunc-
tion9 or an action for damages. 10 It is for the author to determine when
and how his creation is to be published, or if it is to be published at
all." This bundle of rights, however, is terminated by general publi-
cation, and the literary creation becomes the property of the general pub-
liec. Common law literary rights are also destroyed by the acquisition
of a statutory copyright, since the two cannot exist simultaneously in
the same literary production. 13
Unlike statutory copyright, common law copyright is of potentially
mdefinite duration since it continues until lost by general publication or
otherwise abandoned. Since the author is given exclusive control of his
creation until general publication, this right is often referred to as "copy-
right before publication" 14 or the "right of first publication." '5
Common law property rights exist as the product of man's creative
8. R.C.A. Mfg. Co. v. Whiteman, 114 F.2d 86, 88 (2d Cir. 1940).
9. Grigsby v. Brecklirdge, 65 Ky (2 Bush) 480, 92 Am. Dec. 509 (1867)
10. See, e.g., Liggett & Meyer Tobacco Co. v. Meyer, 101 Ind. App. 420, 194 N.E.
206 (Ct. App. 1935).
11. Frohman v. Ferris, 238 IM. 430, 87 N.E. 327 (1909); Grigsby v. Breckmnridge, 65
Ky (2 Bush) 480, 92 Am. Dec. 509 (1867); Palmer v. DeWitt, 47 N.Y. 532 (1872)
12. Associated Press v. International News Serv., 245 F 244, 250 (2d Cit. 1917),
aff'd 248 U.S. 215 (1918); Palmer v. DeWitt, 47 N.Y. 532 (1872)
Common law copyrights, however, are not abandoned by a lirmted rather than a
general publication. Where the publication is limited to a selected group of persons,
and its use restricted, there has been no general publication. American Tobacco Co. v.
Werckmeister, 207 U.S. 284 (1907); Hrshon v. United Artists Corp., 243 F.2d 640, 645
(D.C. Cit. 1957).
When a literary work is exhibited for a particular purpose, or to a
limited number of persons, it will not be construed as a general gift or
authority for any purpose of profit or publication by others. An author
retains his right in us manuscript until he relinquishes it by contract, or
some unequivocal act indicating an intent to dedicate it to the public. An
unqualified publication by printing and offering for sale is such a dedica-
ton. Palmer v. DeWitt, 47 N.Y. 532, 543 (1872).
See also Nimmer, Copyright Publication, 56 CoLum. L. REv. 185, 200 (1956).
13. Caliga v. Inter Ocean Newspaper Co., 215 U.S. 182 (1909); Warner Bros. Pic-
tures v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 102 F Supp. 141 (S.D. Cal. 1951).
Because common law copyright is destroyed by publication, statutory copyright
creates a new property right by providing protection for a specific period of time
after publication. The two are, therefore, complementary See H. BALL, supra note 1,
at § 10.
Common law copyright protection is also extinguished by conduct indicating aban-
doument. Boucicault v. Wood, 3 F Cas. 988 (No. 1693) (C.C .ND. Ill. 1867).
14. See, e.g., Palmer v. DeWitt, 47 N.Y. 532, 537 (1872).
15. Id., Pushman v. New York Graphic Soc'y, Inc., 287 N.Y. 302, 307, 39 N.E.2d
249, 250 (1942).
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mind, regardless of their expressed form.16 The author may claim an in-
tellectual product as his own in whatever form it can be identified as his
creation. Complete originality, however, is not necessary in order to
make an intellectual creation the subject of literary property, so long as
it is original in its construction. 17 Nor is artistic quality or literary merit
essential for obtaining literary protection.'
There seems to be little restriction on the variety of literary creations
subject to common law copyright protection, assuming that such a
creation is neither immoral nor contrary to public policy 19 Such pro-
tection is generally accorded all literary, dramatic, or musical pro-
ductions.20 Specific examples include letters,2 ' works of art,22 photo-
graphsm s the collection of news,24 and lectures.2 5
A great weight of authority, however, has consistently refused any
form of copyright protection in abstract ideas.26 The opinion of Mr.
Justice Brandeis, that "the noblest of human productions-mowledge,
truths ascertained, conceptions, and ideas-become, after voluntary
commumcation to others, free as the air to common use" '7 has been
widely echoed by the courts.
16. White v. Kimmell, 94 F Supp. 502, 504 (S.D. Cal. 1950). "Every new and in-
nocent product of mental labor, which has been embodied m writing, or some other
material form is the exclusive property of its author. " Aronson v. Baker, 43
N.J. Eq. 365, 12 A. 177, 178 (Ch. 1888).
17. Schwarz v. Umversal Pictures Co., 85 F Supp. 270 (S.D. Cal. 1945); Aronson v.
Baker, 43 NJ. Eq. 365, 12 A. 177 (Ch. 1888). See generally H. BALL, supra note 1, at
§§ 46-48.
18. Dieckhaus v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 54 F Supp. 425 (ED. Mo.
1944), rev'd on other grounds, 153 F.2d 893 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 716
(1946); Baker v. Libbie, 210 Mass. 599, 97 N.E. 109 (1912).
19. Keene v. Kimball, 82 Mass. (16 Gray) 545, 549 (1860).
20. Stevens v. Continental Can Co., 308 F.2d 100, 103-04 (6th Cir. 1962), cert. denied,
374 U.S. 810 (1963); Frohman v. Ferris, 238 Ill. 430, 87 N.E. 327 (1909); Tomkins v.
Halleck, 133 Mass. 32 (1882); Palmer v. DeWitt, 47 N.Y. 532 (1872).
21. Grigsby v. Breckinridge, 65 Ky (2 Bush) 480, 92 Am. Dec. 509 (1867); Baker v.
Libbie, 210 Mass. 599, 97 N.E. 109 (1912); see generally H. BALI, supra note 1, at S 225.
22. American Tobacco Co. v. Werckmneister, 207 U.S. 284 (1907); Stevens v. Con-
tinental Can Co., 308 F.2d 100 (6th Cir. 1962)
23. Caliga v. Inter Ocean Newspaper Co., 215 U.S. 182 (1909).
24. International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
25. McDermott Commission Co. v. Board of Trade, 146 F 961, 963 (8th Cir. 1906)
26. See, e.g., Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d
Cir. 1960); Desny v. Wilder, 46 Cal.2d 715, 299 P.2d 257 (1956); Thomas v. R.J.
Reynolds Tobacco Co., 350 Pa. 262, 38 A.2d 61 (1944); see generally P. Wr-rENBRG,
TnE LAW oF Lr-xARy PRoPERTY 178-82 (1957); Nimmer, The Law of Ideas, 27 S. CAL.
L. REv. 119 (1954)
27. International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 250 (1918) (dissenting
opinion).
An idea is usually not regarded as property, because all sentient beings
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While the courts have refused protection to the originator of an
idea in actions based upon the property concepts inherent in com.
mon law copyright, relief has often been granted under the theories
of express contract,2 18 contract implied-in-law,29 contract implied-in-
fact,30 and breach of confidential relationship.31 In the typical case based
upon contract implied-m-law, the plaintiff has disclosed his idea to the
defendant, and the defendant has received such benefit therefrom that
the law implies an obligation to pay 32
Even where courts have granted protection to the originator of an
idea under a contract theory, they have often required that the idea
be first reduced to a "concrete" or tangible form.3 Similarly, there
is some authority3 4 requiring that any literary creation be reduced to
writing or other material form before it is accorded common law
copyright protection. Of course, no copyright protection is given by
the common law even to abstract ideas reduced to writing, but rather
to the manner of expression of that idea."
may conceive and evolve ideas throughout the gamut of their powers
of cerebration and because our concept of property implies something
which may be owned and possessed to the exclusion of all other persons.
Desny v. Wilder, 46 Cal2d 715, 299 P.2d 257, 265 (1956).
Cf. the opinion by Judge Irving Lehman: "There may be literary property in .a
particular combination of ideas or m the form in which the ideas are embodied. There
can be none in the ideas." Fendler v. Morosco, 253 N.Y. 281, 287, 171 N.E. 56, 58
(1930).
28. See, e.g., Weitzenkorn v. Lesser, 40 Cal.2d 778, 256 P.2d 947 (1953); Brunner v.
Sti, 352 Mo. 1225, 181 S.W.2d 643 (1944).
29. See, e.g., Matarese v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 158 F.2d 631 (2d Cir. 1946);
Belt v. Hamilton Natel Bank, 168 F Supp. 689 (D.D.C. 1952); Ryan & Associates v.
Century Brewing Ass'n, 185 Wash. 600, 55 P.2d 1053 (1936).
30. See, e.g, Weitzenkorn v. Lesser, 40 Cal.2d 778, 256 P.2d 947 (1953); Cole v.
Phillips H. Lord, Inc., 262 App. Div. 116, 28 N.Y.S.2d 404 (1941).
31. See e.g., Radium Remedies Co. v. Weiss, 173 Minn, 342, 217 N.W 339 (1928);
Sachs v. Cluett-Peabody & Co., 265 App. Div. 497, 39 N.Y.S.2d 853 (1943);, cf. Cole v.
Phillips H. Lord, Inc., 262 App. Div. 116, 28 N.Y.S.2d 404 (1941).
32. Weitzenkorn v. Lesser, 40 Cal.2d 778, 256 P.2d 947 (1953). See, e.g., Matarese v.
Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 158 F.2d 631 (2d Cir. 1946).
33. See, e.g., Belt v. Hamilton Nat'l Bank, 108 F Supp, 689 (D.D.C. 1952); Stanley
v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 35 Cal. 2d 653, 221 P.2d 73 (1950); Brunner v. Sux,
Baer & Fuller Co., 352 Mo. 1225, 181 S.W.2d 643 (1944); Thomas v. R. J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co., 350 Pa. 262, 38 A.2d 61 (1944) For a discussion of what form an idea
must take to fulfill the requirement of "concreteness," see Nimmer, The Law of Ideas,
27 S. CA. L. Ray. 119, 140-44 (1954).
34. Thompson v. Famous Players-Lasky Corp., 3 F.2d 707 (N.D. Ga. 1925); Palmer v.
DeWitt, 47 N.Y. 532, 537 (1872).
35. Fendler v. Morosco, 253 N.Y. 281, 171 N.E. 56 (1930); accord, Schonwald v. F
Burkhart Mfg. Co., 356, Mo. 435, 202 S.W.2d 7 (1947)
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Assuming that this tangibility requirement is uniformly applied to
the law of copyright before publication, there is little doubt that spon-
taneous oral conversation cannot be the subject of such protection.-
Until recently, the courts have rarely been confronted with this issue.
The recent decision in Estate of Henrgway v. Random House, Inc., 1
however, discusses this and other objections to making oral conversa-
tions the subject of literary ownership.
ESTATE OF HEMINGWAY V RANDOM HOUSE, INC.
Following the death of Ernest Hemingway in 1961, a dispute arose
over the ownership of the content of conversations which A. E. Hotch-
ner had had with Hemingway Defendant Hotchner had been a close
friend of Ernest Hemingway during the last thirteen years of Heming-
way's life. During this period, Hotchner, himself an author and play-
wright of some note, had been a frequent visitor and traveling com-
pamon of Hemingway, had written several articles about Hemingway,
and had adapted several of Hemingway's works for motion pictures
and television. Conversations between Hemingway and the defendant
were filled with reminiscense, anecdote, and literary opinion, and Hotch-
ner had made accurate notes of each conversation soon afterward, often
employing a tape recorder during the conversations.
Several years after Hemingway's death, Hotchner wrote a book en-
tided Papa Hemmgway. A Personal Memoir, which was published by
the co-defendant, Random House, Inc. The book is drawn primarily
from the author's notes and recollections and may be described as a
biographical portrait of the last decade of Hemingway's life. Through-
out the narration, the author includes extensive quotation from his con-
versations with Hemingway 3"
Ernest Hemingway's wife, the plaintiff in this action, contended that
"all of the material incorporated in the book which is based upon
the language, expressions, comments and communications of Ernest
Hemingway, is subject to a common law copyright . . which right
36. See notes 43-49 mnfra and accompanying text for a discussion of the tangibility
requirement as applied to spontaneous oral conversations.
37. 49 Misc. 2d 726, 268 N.Y.S.2d 531 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd. mem., 25 App. Div. 2d 719,
269 N.Y.S.2d 366 (1966); 53 Misc. 2d 462, 279 N.YS.2d 51 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd. mern., 29
App. Div. 2d 633, 285 N.Y.S.2d 568 (1967), aff'd., 23 N.Y.2d 341, 244 NE.2d 250,
296 N.YS.2d 771 (1968).
38. The statement of facts is taken primarily from 23 N.Y.2d 341, 244 N.E2d 250,
296 N.Y.S.2d 771.
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belongs solely to his estate." '9 This claim was based on the theory that
the quotations from the conversations of Hemingway were his literary
creation and property, and that the defendant's note-taking only per-
formed the mechanics of recordation.
[Hemingway's] speech, constituting not just a statement of his
ideas but the very form in which he conceived and expressed them,
was as much the subject of common law copyright as what he
might himself have committed to paper.
40
The New York Supreme Court twice rejected the plaintiff's claim of
literary property in her decedent's conversations, or in any spontaneous
oral conversations. While affirming the lower court's decision, the
New York Court of Appeals indicated that there might be a proper
case in which common law copyright protection would be given to
spontaneous oral converations.42 The purpose here is to review the
various considerations involved in determining how far common law
protection might extend to oral conversations.
The Tangibility Requirement
Perhaps the most obvious objection to property rights in one's oral
conversation is the intangible nature of the speech involved. The same
reasoning which has been applied to the case of abstract ideas, discussed
earlier, might also be applied to oral conversation:
39. 49 Misc. 2d at -, 268 N.YS.2d at 534.
Plaintiff also contended (1) that the defendant's book would unfairly compete with
the literary works of Ernest Hemmgway; (2) that the defendant acquired his notes
while in a position of trust and confidence; and (3) that the references to the plaintiff
contained in the book violate her statutory right of privacy under § 51 of the New
York Civil Rights Law. id.
The New York Court of Appeals disposed of these contentions by concluding
(1) that the defendant's book did not compete at all with Ernest Hemingway's works;
(2) that if there were a confidential relationship, it did not relate to the conversations
published; and (3) that Mrs. Hemmgway is a public figure. 23 N.Y.2d 341, 244
N.E.2d 250, 296 N.Y.S.2d 771.
40. 23 N.Y.2d at 345, 244 N.E.2d at 254, 296 N.YS.2d at 776.
41. 49 Misc. 2d 726, 268 N.Y.S.2d 531 (1966); 53 Misc. 2d 462, 279 N.YS.2d 51
(1967). In the earlier case, the plaintiff sought to enjoin publication of the defendant's
book, while in the later case, plaintiff brought an action for recovery. The first case
is noted in 67 COLum. L. REv. 366 (1967); 52 IowA L. REv. 105 (1966); 39 U. COLO. L.
Rav. 143 (1966).
42. 23 N.Y.2d 341, 244 N.E.2d 250, 296 N.Y.S.2d 771.
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A distinction exists between physical and mental efforts in that
the former produces corporeal and the latter incorporeal re-
sults An idea, sometimes likened to ferae naturae, does not
have physical attributes and escapes the creator's dominion when
uttered.43
The lower court ruled in the Hemingway case that there can be no
property rights in conversation even though it may be preserved through
the use of recording devices 44 but the court did not base this conclusion
on the argument that recording alone is insufficient to fulfill any re-
quirement of tangibility Failing to rest their decision on such a re-
quirement, the lower court argued, rather, that to restrict the use of oral
conversations to non-verbatim accounts would only create inaccuracy
and encourage fictionalization. The use of recording devices, therefore,
should not be discouraged by granting common law copyright protec-
tion only to recorded versions.45
• Indeed, the New York Court of Appeals has apparently concluded
that it is not the fact that a conversation is intangible that prevents it
from receiving copyright protection. 4 The creation of a literary work,
the court reasons, is given copyright protection rather than its tangible
embodiment.47 The court has wisely chosen to follow the argument of
a leading authority in the field of copyrights that, "the underlying ra-
tionale for common law copyright (i. e., the recognition that a property
status should attach to the fruits of intellectual labor) is applicable re-
gardless of whether such labor assumes tangible form." 48
The court also has refused to grant protection to oral conversation
based upon the plaintiff's analogy to the common law copyright protec-
43. Brunner v. Snx, Baer & Fuller Co., 352 Mo. 1225, 181 S.W.2d 643, 646 (1944);
cf. Schonwald v. F Burkhart Mfg. Co., 356 Mo. 435, 202 S.W.2d 7, 12 (1947).
44. 53 Misc. 2d at -, 279 N.Y.S.2d at 60-61.
45. id.
46. 23 N.Y.2d at 346, 244 N.E.2d at 254, 296 N.Y.S.2d at 776-77
47. Id.
48. M. Nimma COPYIGHT § 11.1 (1966).
The circumstance that a thought or emotion has been recorded in a
permanent form renders its identification easier, and hence may be impor-
tant from the point of view of evidence, but it has no significance as a
matter of substantive right. If, then, the decisions indicate a general right
to privacy for thoughts, emotions, and- sensations, these should receive
the same protection, whether expressed in writing, or in conduct, in con-
versation, in attitudes, or in facial expression. Warren & Brandeis, The
Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. Rzv. 193, 206 (1890).
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rion given to personal letters.49 While the court characterizes personal
letters as "a kind of half-conversation in written form," 50 it recognizes
that conversational speech is a separate and distinctive form of human be-
havior, and therefore presents unique considerations. Frequently, differ-
ent motivations prompt these two forms of communication just as the
mannerisms of expression often differ between the two. The analogy is
thus an unsatisfactory one and was properly rejected by the court.
The Reciprocal Nature of Speech
One of the lower court's primary considerations in the Heimngway
case was the reciprocal nature of the oral conversations involved:
Conversation is a media of expression of umque character. Be-
cause of its several nature any conversational exchange necessarily
reflects the various participants thereto not only with respect to
the direct contributions of each but also insofar as each party acts
as a catalyst in evoking the thoughts and expressions of the other.
The articulations of each are to some extent indelibly colored by
the intangible influence of the subjective responses engendered by
the particular other. Conversations cannot be catalogued as merely
the cumulative product of separate and unrelated individual efforts,
but, on the contrary, it is rather a synthesized whole that is in-
divisibly welded by the interaction of the parties involved.51
The plaintiff replied that Hemigway's contributions to the con-
versations with the defendant were self-sufficient literary products. The
court rejected this contention also, arguing that it would lead to the
problem of measuring the relative self-sufficiency of each parties' con-
tributions to the conversations.5 2 Because the contributions of each par-
ticipant cannot be clearly segregated from the thought processes of the
other, the court concluded that copyright protection should not be
granted to either party.
This conclusion has been properly criticized for failing to recognize
the originality of each participant's contribution prerequisite to copy-
right protection.53 While the contribution of each party is influenced by
-49. 23 N.y.2d at 346-47, 244 NE.2d at 254, 296 N.Y.S.2d at 777
'50. 23 N.Y.2d at 346, 244 N.E.2d at 254, 296 N.Y.S.2d at 777
51. 49 Misc. 2d at-, 268 N.Y.S,2d at 536-37.
52. 53 Misc. 2d at -, 279 N.Y.S.2d at 59.
53. 67 CoLvm L.- REv. 366, 367 (1967).
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the thoughts of the other, this quality does not differentiate conversation
from any form of written communication which is the subject of liter-
ary protection. The development of most literary productions is in-
delibly colored by the thoughts and ideas of one's contemporaries and
predecessors. Complete originality is not a prerequisite to copyright
protection. Therefore, a mere compilation of the creations of others
may be entitled to separate copyright protecton."
The court is on somewhat firmer ground in pointing out the problem
of measuring the relative self-sufficiency of each parties' contributions
to the conversation. While this is by no means a new inquiry in the area
of copyright infringement, it is certainly the more difficult of resolution
in the case of oral conversation. This is a problem of evidence only,
however, the burden of which falls on the party asserting the infringe-
ment. To assert this problem as a basis upon which to reject literary
protection of oral conversations is to revert to the requirement of tan-
gibility which the court has already rejected.
The Organization and Coherence of Speech
By way of defense, Hotchner asserted that the portions of Heming-
way's conversation quoted were his own version based upon the notes
which he kept, and not necessarily verbatum accounts.5 The court also
points out that the quoted portions of Hemingway's conversation are
given organization and coherence by the defendant. The random and
disconnected nature of conversation is given meaning through the ar-
rangemnet given them in the defendant's book.56 Therefore, copyright
protection for the reported conversations rightfully belong to the de-
fendant author rather than to the plaintiff.57
Although there may be some merit to the court's argument in de-
54. Desny v. Wilder, 46 Cal.2d 715, 299 P.2d 257 (1956); Stanley v. Columbia Broad-
casting Sys., 35 Cal.2d 653, 221 P.2d 73 (1950).
55. 49 Misc. 2d at -, 268 N.Y.S.2d at 536. The defendant also claimed that substan-
tially all verbatim quotations gathered from tape recordings and letters were deleted
from the galley proofs, leaving only the defendant's renditions of Hemingway's con-
versation gathered from his note-taking. Id.
56. Id. at -, 268 N.Y.S.2d at 537.
57. Cf. Harris v. Miller, 50 U.S.P.Q. 306 (S.D.N.Y. 1941). In this case, the plaintiff
had written a book in which he recreated conversations which he had had with Oscar
Wilde. The defendant wrote a play making use of the quoted dialogue, claiming that
they could not be the subject of statutory copyright. The court held that plaintiff was
entitled to copyright protection for the quoted dialogue, pointing out that they were
the plaintiff's own version and were, hence, his own original literary products.
[ ol. 11.248
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termining the outcome of this particular case, this consideration is of litde
help in resolving the issue as originally framed by the court-whether
a person's participation in spontaneous oral conversation may be a lit-
erary creation subject to a common law copyright. One writer has also
criticized the court's argument for failing to recognize that the misap-
propriation of the words of another cannot be defended by asserting
that the wrongdoer has also made contributions to a literary creatton. 8
In emphasizing that the quotations from the conversations of Hem-
ingway are not necessarily verbatim, but rather the defendant's rendi-
ton, the lower court seemingly contradicted one of its earlier agruments
against restricting reportage to only non-verbatim accounts. Such a
result would, as previously discussed, serve to encourage fictionalization.
Therefore, in copyright protection no distinction should be made be-
tween verbatim accounts of a conversation and an author's rendition
based upon later notes.
Undue Restramt Upon the Freedom of Speech
The most important argument advanced by the lower court concerns
the social cost of applying common law copyright as a limitation on
speech-an area pregnant with legal and social implications. "The in-
tellectual benefits derived from access to the m-anate articulations and
experiences of figures of note and achievement are emphatically de-
monstrated by the enduring fame and inspirational stimulus of the works
of recorders such as Plutarch, Boswell, and Carlyle." 59 Citing a "basic
tradition" that "what any man says or does may be reported, quoted or
written about in the interest of maintaining the freedom of access to all
kinds of information," 8 0 the court felt that recognizing literary prop-
erty in oral conversation would have a revolutionary effect upon free-
dom of speech and press.""
This reasoning is criticized as failing to recognize that freedom of
speech encompasses the freedom to express oneself in privacy,°= and
58. 67 CoLuM. L. REv. 366, 368 (1967).
59. 49 Misc. 2d at -, 268 N.Y.S.2d at 536. The court continues by stressing the
necessity of free exchange and dissemination of information in maintaining an informed
citizenry. Id.
60. 53 Misc. 2d at -, 279 N.Y.S.2d at 60.
61. Id. The court does, however, recognize restriction upon this freedom in favor
of the individual's "right to be free from malicious falsehood or invasion of privacy"
Id.
62. 67 CoLum. L. REv. 366, 367 (1967).
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that to allow general publication of remarks intended for only a few is
violative of the first amendment. The New York Court of Appeals, in
restricting the breadth of the lower court's ruling, expressed a similar
opinion:
The indispensable right of the press to report on what people
have said in public does not necessarily imply an un-
bounded freedom to publish whatever they may have said in
private conversation, any more than it implies a freedom to copy
and publish what people may have put down in private writings.63
The Court of Appeals refused to base its decision upon such a consider:-
ation, however, expressly suggesting that common law copyright in
one's oral statements nught conceivably exist in a proper case." Al-
though it is obvious that some form of protection is needed in the case
of conversation intended only for a few, the means suggested by the
Court of Appeals is improper. Common law copyright is directed to-
ward the protection of a property interest in the creator of a literary
production. Other, more appropriate means of protection are, in many
instances, available for the protection of a personal right. The principle
of privacy is such a right. 5 Even though the right of privacy may
not encompass the present problem, a proper expansion of this right
would be a more appropriate relief than an extension of the concept of
common law copyright. Other remedies, such as actions for libel, slan-
der,,or breach of confidence, might be used where appropriate.
CONCLUSION
While the New York Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the
lower court, the court avoided basing its decision on any of the consider-
ations raised in the lower court.
63. 23 N.Y.2d at 347, 244 N.E.2d at 255, 296 N.Y.S.2d at 778.
64. Id. at 348, 244 N.E.2d at 255, 296 N.Y.S.2d at 778.
65. See Warren & Brandeis, The Right To Privacy, 4 HAiv. L. Rav. 193 (1890).
This article represents an important milestone in the development of the right of
privacy Although not of this century, the article anticipates the present problem:
The common law secures to each individual the right of determimng,
ordinarily, to what extent his thoughts, sentiments, and emotions shall
be communicated to others [E]ven if he has chosen to give them
expression, he generally retains the power to fix the limits of publicity
- which shall be given them. The existence of this right does not depend
upon the particular method of expression adopted. Id. at 198-99.
See generally M. ERNsT & A. ScsswAriz, PRivAcy: Ti RiGHT To BE LET ALo-m (1962)
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Over the years of their intimacy, Hemingway imposed no restriction
upon the usage of the notes and recordings he knew the defendant was
making of their conversations. Indeed, the defendant and other writers
had, during Hemingway's lifetime, made free use of quotations from
Hemingway's conversations in articles they had written. Hemingway
made no protest about these practices, even though he occasionally dis-
liked the article published.66
Drawing from these facts, the Court of Appeals chose to base its de-
cision upon an authority implied by the actions of Hemingway to freely
publish his contributions to the conversations had with the defendant.
The court, therefore, did not offer a final resolution of the issue of
whether a spontaneous oral conversation may be the subject of a com-
mon law copyright.
While the present decision fails to dispose of the central problem, the
court speculates on the extent of the common law copyright in oral
dialogue, assuming that such a literary property exists. 67 The court sug-
gested that it should, "at the very least, be required that the speaker in-
dicate that he intended to mark off the utterance in question from the
ordinary stream of speech, that he meant to adopt it as a umque state-
ment and that he wished to exercise control over its publication." 0 8
Such an indication of dominion could be made by the speaker in his
prefatory remarks, or the circumstances under which the conversation
is made.6
The Court of Appeals, however, never established the need for the
common law copyright protection in which it speculates. The vehicle
to be used for protecting the property rights in oral conversation may
already exist. Just as a cause of action for the misappropriation of ab-
stract ideas may be based upon the theories of express contract, con-
tract implied-in-law, contract implied-in-fact, and breach of confidential
66. 23 N.Y.2d 341, 244 N.E.2d 250, 296 N.Y.S.2d 771.
67. Id. at 349, 244 N.E.2d at 256, 296 N.Y.S.2d at 779.
68. Id.
69. In support of this last "speculation," the New York Court of Appeals cites the
earlier decision in Jenkins v. News Syndicate Co., 128 Misc. 284, 219 N.Y.S. 193 (Sup.
Cr. 1926). In that case, the plaintiff verbally disclosed in detail the content of several
articles which she negotiated to write for the defendant newspaper. After the de-
fendant decided not to write the articles, the newspaper published an account of the
interview with the plaintiff, including an accurate reproduction of the articles proposed.
Although the court, in the Jenlans case, recognized a "common law property" in
the plaintiff's verbal account of her proposed articles, the decision is equally based
upon a theory of implied contract. See note 73 infra, and accompanying text.
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relationship, so also may one's property rights be protected in oral con-
versation. Similarly, the vehicle to be used for protecting one's personal
rights in oral conversation may already exist. In short, until the need
for copyright protection can be shown, it is merely useless speculation to
attempt to determine the extent of literary property in conversation.
The informal nature of oral conversation is another important con-
sideration which has been only touched upon as yet. It cannot be
doubted that the vast majority of oral conversation could never have
been intended by its speaker to have been the subject of literary prop-
erty. In those rare occasions where the speaker may have assumed
some form of literary protection, he cannot rely upon that intangible
utterance alone for preservation. Undoubtedly, such a person must com-
mit his words to preservation via writing or other recordation. Indeed,
refusing literary protection to the mere spoken word may serve to en-
courage the preservation of one's literary product, while extinguishing
the requirement of preservation could, conceivably, result in its per-
manent loss.
The literary development of a commumcation will also vary sharply
between common conversation and that intended for preservation.
While the oral dialogue of a few may be as highly developed an any
manuscript, literary protection cannot be extended to only those few,
but must be extended to all.70
Probably the best legal treatment of oral conversation would be the
same now accorded abstract ideas. In absence of the protection of ex-
press or implied contract, the originator of an abstract idea loses all
property rights in that idea upon disclosure to another. Of course, he
may choose not to disclose his idea until it is embodied in such a form
that the law grants protection. Similarly, the participant in an oral
dialogue may easily avail his literary products of copyright protection
by embodiment in a protected form of commumcation.
PAUL M. MORLEY
70. 53 Misc. 2d at 279 N.Y.S.2d at 60.
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